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Discussions of meaning are tied up with discussions of truth. For Frege, sense was a way
of determining a truth value and thoughts were defined as rhal for which the question of truth
arises. Mccinn, amongst others, has argued that reference. and thus truth conditions, are
essential tbr meaning: if a representation does not make a truth claim - and thus open itself
up to the possibility of misrepresentation - it cannot be meaningful. In addition, the
fashionable doctrine of externalism relies on the principle that how things really and truly
are, outside in the external world, makes an essential conribution to meaning.
Meaning has been connected with truth, but there is another side to meaning: understanding.
When I hear you speak I understand something about what you have said. My understanding
js lirnited by the concepts I possess, allered and jnterpreted by my personal obsessions and
world views; and eventually used to generate and inform turther thoughts and actions. This
aspect of meaning is subjective and dependent on the details of my cognirive system.
So the concept of meaning serves two apparently sepanble theoretical purposes: l) that of
determining reference and bear-ing truth condi!ions; and 2) rhat of encapsulating the cognilive
role of an individual's psychological state as it contributes to understanding and behaviour.
How can these two different functions - one concerned with objective, etemal truths,
independent of human cognition; the other concerned with subjective understanding and the
guidance of human action - be reconciled and connected wilhin a single concept of meaning?
Can Truth and Understanding be Reconciled?
One way to reconcile truth and understanding is by modifying the nature of one so as to
make it compatible with the other. The two concepts can be nterged in one of three
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directions: As an example of the first, McGinn' has suggested that we give an extemalist
reading of 'understanding' so that understanding is not exhausted by psychology and
behaviour but includes the world itself courtesy of the mysterious and unexplained ref'erence
relation. People on twin worlds wulerstarul 'water' difl-erentiy even though their brain states
arc identical and they can not discriminate between the two kinds of substance.
McGinn's approach accredits understanding with a grasp of the world which exceeds
psychology, perception, and the rationale which motivates action and connects thoughts - thus
it fails to address the prob)em. The perspectival and iimited processes which guide concrete
lhought and action still require explanation and integration with the truth-conditional /
rcferential component.
A second method of reconciling the disparate aims of meaning is to explain understanding
through the concept of truth on the basis that our subjective meanings do, to some nodest
extent, partake in the objective nature of truth. Truth remains objective, our psychological
nachinations remain subjective; yet there is still a connection which binds both in a two-
factor notion of meaning. Here, understanding is endowed with meaning in virtue of the fact
that a psychological state embodies a lru$ claim. Bui important questions are left
unanswered: what does the app€al to truth do for meaning? Might there not be meanings
which do not take the form of truth claims? What is Truth that representations can paftake
of its nature? Indeed, what is 'fruth that it might form part of our world a( all?
I believe that there are represeDtational contents which do ro, make truth claims, and whose
meanings are not given by truth conditions. The appeal to truth is redundant in relation to
these contents. Further, the concept of Truth as an absolute - etemal, objective and
independent from the psychological properties of intentional agents - has no place in the
natural world and must be revised. I want to suggest fiat our concept of truth should be
naturalised and explained by representation (and not the other way about as is often
supposed); for meaning (and understanding) precedes truth and is ideperulent of it. Thus I
am adopting a third view of the relationship between understanding and truth, where trutb
is reduced to, or at least conceived in terms of, primitive representational processes which
' Mccinn 'Thr Structure of Contenl in ThouBht atu! Ohjed ed Andrew Wooilfield 1982 (Clarendon)
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aiready contain the germs of understandine.
Other projects, ditferent from mine, also abandon a commitment to truth_beyond-our-
understanding. Talk of truth cao be replaced \,",ith talk of norms _ where norms are
unconcealed and apparent on the surface of a community,s practice. For example, communal
ratification can be taken as that which determines the meaning of representational behaviour.
But ratification accounts are depressingiy sirnilar to truth_conditr.onal accounts:
Truth and Ratification
According to Frege, truth is objective and eternal, and thoughts are independent of their
bearers - transcending any one way of representing the world. yet our psychological states
have meaning in virtue ol the truth conditions attached to them. No clear truth-condidons _
no meaning. Ifyou don't like the idea of transcendent tfuths, this schema can remain intacl:
you simply replace truth with pubric ratification. so the meaning of any prece of behaviour
will depend on the conditions under which a community ratify rhat behaviour as according
with a given concept. Either way the meaning of the representatron lies ()llLrile the
representor, and is determined by something which is pub)icly available. Individual
psychology and the non-conceptual re ignored.
I contest his schema l do not berieve that represenrationar states are endowed with meaning
because of truth-conditions or public ratification. Meaning exists where it would be
rnappropnate for us to talk of truth-conditions; and meaning occurs before the deveropment
of standardized practices which are intended to obey, or which can be seen to obey, soctetal
norms. Many meanings are as they are irulependentl) orf norms present within a community,
and independentry of a conrmunity finding reuon t. judge cerain activities as meaninsful.
Truth conditional and ratification accounts arike, are prejudiced in favour of the rational
subject, possessed ofa language, engaging in thought at a conceptual level. It is assumed that
where-ever there is a meaning, a human community will be able to ascertain that meaning.
We re4uire proof that meaning is present - we demand thal itbe manif?st, op€n to public
vrew and comprehensibie to us; we insist rhar it be epistemicafly well behaved - fitring tidily
into a series of non-contradictory definitionar conditions in accordance wrth our rogic. we
claim that meanings must be communicable, mating sens,e at a conceptual level, and being
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impervious to subject-specific acts about individual's psychological states.
Yet meanings ccn reside within a sirrgle irulividual, car be incom nnitr1Dlr to other people;
and can be indepctulut of conceptualised rearans lbr positing those meanings. Meanings do
not detP.nd on our being able to give determinate specif'ications of the conditions under which
they would be true or under which they would be rotirt?d aJ true. And meanings may be
fuzzy, muddled, and no, amenable to conceptual specification.
What I urge is that we forgo the logocentric obsession with truth, evidence and conceptual
rationalisationi and allow meaniDg ontological existence and a place in the natural world. A
lheory of meaning should be able to show how conceptual thought has evolved from the
wealth of more basic meaningful activities which underpin our ability to interact with, and
survive in. the world.
An Alternative View of Meaning:
Adrian Cussins has been developing a theory of non-conceptual conrcnt'. Non conceptual
ontents are contents which can only be described usrng concepts which the subject (who has
the content) does not possess. For example, a subject who isignomnt of neuroscience might
have a non-conceptual content which is best defined in terms of neuronal activity.
Non-conceptual contents are not specified in terms of truth-conditions holding in the Fregean
reahn of refercnce (i.e. the domain of objects objectively and independently existing in the
exiemai world). Instead, non-conceptual contents are explained in lerms of tbe reoln of
enbodim?nt - which is an amalgan of a subject anrl its environment oft1 the subject's
abilities to act within the environment.
This approach to content reflects the idea that: when I am aware of an object, part of what
I am aware of is its position rtlative to zrysef and ny ubilit]" to itreract with it - to
coordinate my perceptual responses with appropriate motor responses. My experiential
content concems not just the object, but also nysell. I may not be aware of my abilities d/
' i19901 'The Connectionist Construction of Conc€pts', in Tte Philosophy of Artificial InteltiSence d
Boden (OUP): and also ( 1992) 'Contenl, Embodimenl & Objc.t ivi ty ' .  Mrnd l0l
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o conccptuol level - | may not have the words to describe the physiological process through
which I can rcach out to touch an object, or track it 's movemcnts. But I embody non
conceplua) knowledge of m1 slrl ls.
Because non-conceptual contents concern not just external objects, but also internal abilities:
these contents can not be disentangled from their physical embodiment. The yellcla of content
is inseparable from the content itself. Instead of lmking at wlor is represented; we now need
to ask ,how a content represeDts.
Some contents have a conceptual as well as a non-conceptual element: but other contents -
perhaps animal contents - are purely non-conceptual. An important point to note is that
purely non conceptual contents need not make tnrlll tlaims, or make rt*rence ro an object
in ihe world, The cognitive significance of a non-conceptual content is n!)t a cloim made
about a reality beyond the subject's current state of awareness:
It is sometimes said that representation necessarily takes the form: 'there is a state of affairs
in the world, o, and o is P' (and it is this forn which leads to tlte claim that representation
always involves nisrepresen tation, since it is possible that o is nol P). Bul non conceptual
contents do not conform to this pattern. This is because oon-conceptLlal contents do not t irst
identify an external object ard then go on to form propositions abofi iI. E\periutia[
representation does not distinguish benyeen the ao of erperiencing, antl the object xthich is
experienced, an{l the \\)oy in vthich the object is e-rperienced.
A subject may fail to comprehend that there is a obTccl which is erperienced at this time, and
in this place, and is this way; but that the very same object could be experienced at a
different time, or in a different place, or in a different way. There may be no awareness that
the object is separate from the subject and the subject's ability to act; and there may be no
recognition that the object could ever be experienced by another subiect. ,4 prinili!€
representor need lruve o awareness of tht suhj(r / ohjrct rclation: or rtf whut 'an objttt'
iJ.
Representation need not be a case of identifying an independent object in the world ond thu












distinguish between wlal is experienced and iory it is experienced and reacted to. A non-
conceptual content does not separafe the subject iom the object, and so does not make what
Frege called a reference.
If there is ar) sense in which the content has a referent, the referent would be an
undifferentiated combination oforganisrn. environment and skills. Such a referent wor,rld not
be repeatable or sharable; it would be bound up in a pa icular moment. There is certainly
no referent in the traditional Fregean sense - something externul and re,identif.able and,
understood in familiar conceptual terms. I\,loreover, the subject of the content in /erLl.t no truth
claim or reference - having no awareness rhat the expe ence might be false: or that the
rcference might fail.
A truth-conlittonal representation presents the subject with an understanding of the world as
oLhsr - as something extemal and independent; and of the representation itseif as something
which is incomplete and fallible. Conceptualist theo es of conient offer no explanation of
how this divide adses within experience. Cussins' theory is meant o fil l this deficit by
showing ftorv we can come to think of ourselves as subjects, and think of objecls as external
lo, and independent of, perception. He hopes to explain how we begin to refer by stabilizing
and inrcgrating our various non-conceptual contents. There is no time to discuss Cussins'
thmry of the development of conceptual content from non-conceptual content; but an
lmportant point to note is that the development ol conceptual content is not linear,
Two competing factors ddve the development of representation. Firstly a need for stable
general and abstract multi-purpose re usable concepts, and secondly a need for accumcy
which calls for context sensitivity and flexibility. As leaming takes place we make new
connertions between o1d and developing conteDls - this changes the topology of our
reprcsentational l ndscapes, and thus previously stabilised concepts become inadequate and
subside. karning undercuts tability, concepts are at besr provisJonal.
Our stabilised concepts are composites which can be taken apafl and restructured in ntore
promising ways. Because we ccz categorise the world in various ways urul aI (liffercnt
senantic levels - some of which do not even recognise the subject/object distinction; our
contents can not be captured simply by looking at what we would normally (conceptually)
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think of them as referring to. The matter is more complex. A semantics is as much a
representation o/the internal connectivity of the organism as it is o/the environment. I now
want to explore sorne possible consequences of a theory of non-conceptual content:
Naturalism and Psychologism
First, the plan is one which fits in well with the project of Naturalism. Non-conceptual
contents begin with very primitive activities carried out by organisms in response to
environmental pressures; as behaviour becomes morc complicated, conceptual contents
develop. Conceptual contents are built out of non-conceptual contents, There is an
explanatory continuity here which is missing fronr conceptualist accounts of meaning. The
post-Fregean semantic tradition has been hysterical)y opposed to psychologism, keeping
philosophy separate froDr psychology and lhe rest of science. Cussins avoids this divisive
stance, by taking content to be dependent upon the subject of cognition he embraces both
psychologism and naturalism.
Frege's objection to psychologism was that it tainted the eternal and objective realm of truth
with that which was mortal, subjective and fallible. But if truth is to be nanrralised, this is
a fair price to pay. Trulh is a concept humans use to measure the worth of their
representations; thus truth must be truth rehtivt to a way (or set of ways) of representing
the world; and relative to a goal (or set of goals) which those represenations are supposed
to assist. The idea of a 'perfectly true' representation, independent of subjective purpose, is
nonsensical: it is akin to the mistake of asking what the world look like independently of
being seen.
Thus it is a mistake to avoid psychologism on the grounds that it relativises truth, for truth
is necessarily relative. Thus we should not take absolute truth as a goal for / criterion by
which to judge, representations. Truth cannot exist independently of representations; but if
Cussins is right about non-conceptual content, representations can exist independently of
truth.
Rather than explaining representational ctivity through the concept of truth, we should
explain our use of the concept of truth (which is itself a representational practice) in terms
of primitive representational contents. Tmrh depends on thought which depends on non-
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linguistic action. There are no explanatory gaps to be countenatced on a priori grounds. By
Iemoving the bafficade which separates philosophy frorn psychology, \a,e bccomc l'rec to
explore the development of language from non-linguistic activity. lf the psychological is
allowed to make its proper contribution to the theory ol meaning, we will bc in a position
to rcconsider the role of subjective understanding in guiding our Janguage and action.
Individualism
By moving away from a referential semantics which is more corcerned *' ith specitying wlrar
is'truly' in the world, than with asking the more relevant queslioD of roly the world is.l irr
Lr - looking at how we each, by our own particular naturc, contributc to our experience of
the world; we can shed new lighl on the individualism versus externalisr:r debate. There ma)
be public meanings outside the head; but therc are also nreanings in tht haul and in parts of
the head. Meaning occurs at different levels, only r,ar( of $,hir-h are constrained by
conceptual status; and |lore of which have contents which can be exhausted by pojnling to
rcferents in the world.
Our meanings dimly aim at 'what is truly out there'. We do not see lhe,world,as,it- is but
0nly lhe world-as-we-percejve it. So how are we to DreaD the-\a orld -as-it- is rather than the
world-as-we-conceive-it? What resources have we to nlove beyond our own cognitive
constnints? We can only acknowledge our l imitations and hope for new discoveries which
will fu her (though not perfect) our understandiog. we cannot explain subjective human
meaning by (whot we tak to be\ ob)er.t;tve states ol alfairs in the world. We can only explain
meaning by looking at lorf meaning takes placc how it is constituted through life in the
world.
When there was litt le hope of understanding anvthing of how the brain might work; the best
$rategy for categorising meaning may have been in terms of the concepts with which we are
familiar - in terms of our ideas of objects in the world which we can sec and touch and agree
or disagree about within the framework of a shared language and cognition. But as we leam
more of how people process information internal\; about how the structure of a brain
determines the way in which the world is understood: the old conceptual analytic picture is
showing itself to be overly simplistic. Meaning is not a matter of external objects, objective
propositions and etemal truths; but of internal cognitive function made in response to a body,
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desires, abil it ies and an enyironment-
I*tting Go of the Representational Object?
Cussins suggests we pay more attention to l1orv representation takes place; but I think that
this point can be pushed further than Cussins wants to take it. I i  is possible to argue that talk
of the same 'object' being represented in different ways arnounts to an inexact process ol
abstraction. The extreme version of this thesis is to say that the lry'rarl of representation is
figurative, the /?o|r,being all important. The represented objecr, as we understand it, is not
basjc to representalional activity - in some cases i l Inav not even exist and even if i t does we
can never be 'fu]]y' aware of it. The Referent is a construct hypothesised in highly
sophisticated semantic practices and thus representation is not, prinrarily, represelrtation d
somethinS.
Note that I am not claiming that representations are aiways (y'ideas. In 'The Thought' Frege
warned against the doctrine that we can only be aware ofour onr ideas - a view which leads
to solipsism. But we need not, l ike Frege, think that must choose between saying that we are
aware of an external objectivc realm; and saying thal we are aware r/ideas. I agree that if
we use the 'representation of' schema then we must do so within the framework of our
language as ordinurily understootl where what we refer to are indeed 'objects in the world'.
But there are limitations on our representational capacities and it may be that the function we
perform when we 'refer to an object' is different frorn, and perhaps incompatible with our
theoretical understanding of it. Maybe the 'representation of schema' is misguided.
On the model I am exploring, there orc ways of reconstructjng our notions of reference, lruth
and representation. But reference is no longer a nagic relation which extends meaning
beyond our understanding, and our perceptual and discriminatory capacities. Our concepts
break down as our needs and abilities change. What once seemed to be 'an object' later
appears as a composite or a confusion. Yet 'failure' in reference does nol imply an absence
of meaning -for representation is not, primarily, represcntation rf.. . or the posiring of lrutlrs.
This mod€l may appear contradictory. It moves away fronr the realnr of reference and fiom
an externalist semantics. It takes away the guarantee that our words perfectly refer to worldly
entit ies. Yet it makes much of the notion of embodiment. The exDlanation is that even an
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intemalist semantics must be understood as having arisen in response to the world.
Representations which control action in the world must be sensitive to both body and world.
Thus, where an extemalist semantics is thrown into the wodd and out of the body in order
to demonslrate its intentionality; an intemalist semantics works in the world and through the
world but never forgets the body or the practicalities of life.
Conclusion
We should abandon the ideal of'perfectly true' representations, and the overly simplistic
classification of contents by their 'objeclive referenls'. We must admit lhat evolved
rcpresentations may ,(r/ map tidily onto a world of discreet objects - 'natural kinds' which
fortuitously exist in the categories we happen to have chosen for thenr. Our contents may
resist the format of propositions, universally graspable by all; instead our thoughts may be
subjective in nature.
It is time to rid ourselves of the myth thal human thought is always rational in one rigid wa\',
and realise that our strength lies in lhe ability to pragmatically switch between perspectives
and adopt new strategies - none of which are the perfect approach to the world, but all ot
which may help us to further our aims. By losing our devotion to the abstract ideal of truth,
we can gain in the more practical riches of wisdom.
I reject he concept of truth which has been used to shape, restrict and over reach theories
of meaning. Yet I am a realist, believing that existence is as it is independent of human
categorisations and judgement. So I still have use for a concept which closely resembles
truth. Thus I am not so much eliminating truth as altering its theoretical role. Truth does Dot
explain and detine meaning; naturally, meaning pre-exists and explains the thought of truth.
